The Palestinians in Israel: The Challenge of the Indigenous Group Politics in the ‘Jewish State’

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Abstract

The Palestinians in Israel are those Palestinians who remained on their land during the Nakba in 1948, and later became Israeli citizens. The political discourse of Palestinians in Israel has moved during the last two decades, since the Oslo agreement, from the individual achievements level to the politics of rights on the collective level, and to the politics of identity. This discourse is considered of utmost importance in the politics of indigenous marginalized groups within colonial entities. Similarly, it represents a change in the evolution of the political discourse of Palestinians in Israel throughout the last two decades. In the following article we will analyze the main political changes that occurred among the Palestinian minority in Israel since 1948 and the main challenges that they raise for the Palestinians in facing the “Jewish state”.

Introduction

The Palestinians in Israel are absent or made absent from general awareness and perception of most of the groups around them and even those distant from them including the Jews in Israel; the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and the Palestinians in diasporas. This situation is a product of the special situation these Palestinians have, as they live in a state that was forced on them and does not represent them. A striking example of the attitude of the ruling majority towards the Palestinian minority in Israel is in the statements reportedly made by Israeli officials, including the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, that as part of the peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, the Palestinian side should accept Israel as a “Jewish state” and the political agenda of prominent parties and political leaders who are part of the Israeli government and enjoy significant support among Israeli Jews.

The head of the Israeli opposition in the Knesset, Tzipi Livni, declared in the past: “I would like to see Israel as a house for the Israeli Arabs, but Israel can’t be a national house for them”. This comparison of a “house” and a “national house” is reminiscent of the comparison Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon made between rights “from the country” (which are Jewish), and rights “in the country” for the residents in the country. These comparisons also hark back to the comparison made by the previous head of the Israeli High Court, Aharon Barak, who said “This is a Jewish home, the home keys are given to the Jews through the Law of Return, whereas anyone living in this home deserves equal rights”. These statements reflecting the prevailing Zionist ideology in Israel prevent Palestinian citizens from being a citizen with equal rights to those enjoyed by the Jews, as the state is owned and established for the Jewish people. Because of the purpose of the establishment of the state, the Jewish people must be the
majority and give the state its character. This government approach is supported by a sweeping majority among the Jewish public in Israel.4

In this article we maintain that Palestinians in Israel’s development are part of the general context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. This allows us to understand the success experienced by a European colonialist movement in occupying a region of the third world. It did so via various bodies and managed to defeat the indigenous people there. Here, one must explain colonialism and explain the Jewish exclusivity in Palestine as a colonial project on the one hand, and clarify the defeat of the indigenous people and their inability to oust colonialism despite the ongoing conflict, on the other hand.

Basic Data

In 2010 the number of Palestinians in Israel5 was around 1,200,000 and made up 16% of the total population in Israel.6 The birth rate among Palestinians reached 4.3 per thousand, and though reduced from an average of nine children in the 1960s to an average of five children in the early 1980s. This indicates a decrease in the average birth rate among Palestinians in Israel. Nonetheless, it is still higher compared to the Jewish population among whom the birth rate is a relatively low 2.6 per thousand.7 Population growth led to the expansion of Arab towns and their transformation into cities. While there are 112 Israeli towns with populations of 5,000 or more, there are 41 Arab towns, 15 of which have populations greater than 10,000. In some places, a geographic contiguity appeared between Arab towns. In other areas, the Palestinians make up the overwhelming majority (Nazareth area, Sakhneen area, the Wadi Aara area, Majd Al-Kurom and Tamra-Shfa’amr). In addition, there are those who reside in the mixed coastal cities.

Statistics indicate that in 2001, approximately 87% of Palestinians lived in 107 Arab population centers, whereas 8% live in mixed areas and the rest live in villages that have yet to be recognized by the state.8 The demographic transformations among Palestinians in Israel have strengthened and nurtured their self-confidence. In turn, the structure of villages changed and relative development occurred since the 1970s. The increased self-confidence became the basis for development in cultural life and political work in various venues. The will and effort to develop a separate economy was greater than ever in Arab towns and cities, however. It has yet to succeed.

On the subject of age distribution, the Palestinians in Israel are considered younger than the Jewish population. In the year 2003, for example, 41% of Palestinians were below the age of 15. In the Jewish sector, though, that average reached 25.5%. Similarly, 3.2% of Palestinians in Israel are 65 years or older, compared to 11.8% in the Jewish sector.9 The Palestinians in Israel live in three geographic areas. Most of them (about 56.6%) live in the Galilee area. This region spans from Haifa in the west and Beesan in the east to the Lebanese border in the north. Some 23% of them live in the Triangle, a region close to the West Bank border, parallel to the coastline. It extends from south east Haifa to east Tel-Aviv. Another 12% of Palestinians live in the Naqab area, specifically in the Be’er Al-Sabe’. The rest (about 8.5%) live in the mixed coastal cities, such as Akka (Acre), Haifa, Lydd, Ramla and Jaffa.10 In regard to the distribution of the Palestinians of Israel throughout the various administrative districts, according to statistics from 2003 census, 48% of Palestinians lived in the North District, 17% lived in Jerusalem, 14% lived in the Haifa district, 10% lived in the South District and 11% lived in the Tel-Aviv District.11
The Palestinians in Israel are divided into three religions where Muslims make up the majority, close to 80%. They live in most of the Arab villages and cities and are spread throughout the areas. The Christians are considered the second largest minority group in Israel. They comprise 10% of the Palestinians in Israel and the vast majority live in the Galilee. The Christians are divided into several sects, such as Catholic, Orthodox, Maronite, Armenian, and Protestant. The Druze, the third largest minority group, constitute the remaining 10% of Palestinian population. They reside entirely in the Galilee and the Carmel areas.

The Analytical Framework

The main hurdle facing the Palestinians in Israel arises from the absence of a collective status. This issue affects their situation and their rights on two levels, the national level as a group and the individual level as citizens. Clarifying and defining the status is the most important step in establishing the options available to a minority (including indigenous minority) for the development and cultivation of a positive relationship with the state and with the majority. In the case of the Palestinians in Israel, their rights and their circumstances do not depend on citizenship; instead they rely on the diametric relationship between the native minority and the colonial entity. Thus, the theoretical framework must be revised in accordance with the following two debates: the indigenous minority, the colonial framework and the said framework’s relationship with the native people of this land.

The Indigenous Minority

In some instances, the term “minority” is synonymously used with “national, ethnic, racial and religious groups”. According to the definition of by the United Nations Sub-Commission for Human Rights and the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities a “minority” is a governed group, with citizenship from the state in which it lives. Its unique ethnic, religious and linguistic attributes separate it from the rest of the people in the nation in which it lives. The term “Indigenous Minority” is considered a new political term. It refers to the remaining minority of a group that resides in its own homeland, despite other immigrant groups occupying it or founding a new state on its lands. Such a minority often becomes a political and numerical minority.

The Palestinian minority in Israel is classified as an indigenous one by way of definition and composition. The Palestinian minority in Israel meets most of the criteria to be considered indigenous. These criteria were enumerated by the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The criteria are: early presence, voluntary conservation of cultural uniqueness, self-definition as an indigenous people, refusal to be subjugated, trivialized, marginalized, expelled or discriminated against by the hegemonic society. Additionally, indigenousness emerges from a conditional relationship between, the presence of a group of people as a society, and their attachment to a specific area.

Our main concern within the context of this discussion is the ability of the indigenous minority to preserve its political, social and cultural uniqueness. This ability is part of its collective right to remain distinct from the hegemonic majority. International declarations have affirmed the rights of indigenous groups. For example, agreement number 169 in the second section of Article II on behalf of indigenous and tribal
nations in independent countries affirms, “encouragement of full actualization of cultural, social and economic rights of these nations in all matters related to their cultural and social identity, as well as, their traditions, norms and institutions”.17 In the second section of Article III it reads, “It is prohibited to exercise any form of power or intimidation as such acts constitute an infringement on human rights and the basic rights of the affected people”.18 The first section of Article V states: “Social, cultural, religious and spiritual practices and values are recognized and protected. Taking into consideration the nature of the problems facing these groups, whether as collectives or as individuals”.19 The first section of the declaration on persons belonging to national or ethnic minorities, or those belonging to religious and linguistic minorities reads: “States must each protect minorities, their national or ethnic identity and their linguistic, cultural and religious identity. States must also lay the groundwork to facilitate the cultivation of the various identities”.20

These declarations and others, state that it is the right of an indigenousness people to preserve their culture and identity. They also have the right to refuse any policies that threaten their identity and culture. These rights form the foundation for fair relationships between the minorities, especially the indigenous ones, and the respective states in which they live.21

The Colonial State of Affairs

The theoretical framework in this article derives from the assumption that Israel is a colonial state. This topic raised great academic debate in Israeli academia. Shafir and Peled consider colonialism to be the theoretical framework that is capable of explaining and analyzing the development of Israeli society from 1881 until now. Other researchers consider the colonial character of Israel key to understanding Israeli society, that which carried out the “destruction of another people”.22

Three cases can help in illustrating the relationship between the indigenous local community and the settler society:

- First: exterminating the indigenous local population and settling in its place after gaining control over the area (as was the case in the US and Australia).
- Second: blending the settler society in with the indigenous population and creating one society (South America).
- Third: this case applies to the Israeli-Zionist case. It consists of establishing a settler society alongside the local indigenous population wherein the region is divided among the two groups. In this case, the settler society can be distinguished by its expansionist policies while gradually confining the indigenous population.23

In regard to Zionism, separating the territory from the ideology is an intricate task as the two exist in a symbiotic relationship. The truth is that the diversity of the modes of settlement and control over land, have always had ideological motives. Linking ideology to settlement, control over an area and its subsequent Judaization, is the essence of Zionism, a colonial settlement movement. Zionist ideology has defined the instrument of settlement and its objectives. Thus, understanding the ideology requires an explanation of settlement. The Zionist project relied on a connection with the land, while the land was connected to the ideology. This gave Zionism the intellectual and political legitimacy it sought. The process of rescuing or redeeming the land, Ge’ulat Hakarka, is one of the three intellectual foundations on which Zionist thought relies. The second
The foundation is working the land and finally building on the land. Using these three strategies, the process of land Judaization is complete.24

The foundation of the Judaization idea is far from being an integral part of the democratic system. Oren Yiftachel calls these practices “ethnocracy”, therefore, the ethnocratic regime is founded on a national project that imposes ethnic national hegemony on the domain through the processes of expansion and settlement. In the case of Zionism, the Judaization of the domain and the land produces an ethnocratic regime. Spatial control is one of the important pillars of the ethnocratic regime. Its goal is the “creation of a new ethno-political geography”. The process of “ethnicizing” a disputed region evolves in the following stages: separation of settlements is used to propagate the control of the majority over the land. In this process the minority is labeled a threat to the ethnic control of land. Subsequently, land planning—which enables the ethnic control of the land. Finally, structural discrimination against the minority, denying it access to development projects and access to the distribution of resources.25

Israel has been presented usually by the Israeli and Western academia as a state that was founded in response to Jewish (Zionist) nationalist calls demanding self-determination. This view has found support in the international community through the United Nations Partition Plan and through direct support from various countries around the globe. Additionally, this view is supported by public opinion and the political elite in Israel and even by some Palestinian elites in Israel. Furthermore, the Israeli regime is often presented as a stable “democracy”, containing the primary elements of a Western political democracy. However, it is possible to analyze these main components using theories that have been developed in the West and have been explicitly developed to provide an understanding of state-building processes and the dynamics that underlie them. Other scholars believe that the Israeli system belongs in a long list of liberal systems in the world. Such theories are often used to refute contradictory views.26

Israeli society’s behavior in regard to the absorption of Jewish immigration has been the foundation upon which sociologists in Israel develop their theories about the nature of the Israeli system. Their efforts have focused on presenting Israel as a liberal democratic system based on its policies toward the absorption of immigration, policies similar to those of liberal democratic states in Europe, the United States of America and Canada. Accordingly, Israel is presented as a member of those “enlightened” states which include the above-mentioned states.27

In contrast to those models, another group of scholars has developed an approach which argues that Israel has been founded on the principles of colonialism and has maintained a dual ethnic system, one that favors the interests of the founding ethnic group. Among those scholars are Zureik and Nakhleh,28 who have published a series of studies that show that Israel is in fact, the typical manifestation of classical colonialism. Furthermore, they add that internal contradictions in Israel are typical to colonial experiences elsewhere. Simultaneously, another group of scholars has studied the stratification of Israeli society and its relationship to ethnic groups in the state. Ghanem has argued that the system in Israel has the characteristics of tyranny of the majority. Later, Ghanem and Yiftachel developed an alternative theoretical model to enable an understanding of Israel’s ethnocratic nature and other cases around the globe.29

Our starting point at understanding the relationship between Israel and the indigenous population in Palestine is based on several principles.
First: our analysis is comprehensive and discusses the Palestinian case in Israel while looking at Israel as a whole including Jews and Palestinians.

Second: we analyze Israel by looking at the extent of its political control which is not limited to areas within the Green Line, but includes the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Third: our assumption is that historical processes are determined not by interests, rather by values and social criteria.

Fourth: the reality on the ground determines the nature of analysis, not the intentions of political leaders or the documented ideas of the elite in the state.

Distinguishing this study is its attempt to understand the problematic conditions of Palestinians in Israel and their relationship with the state. This understanding is discussed within the context in which two claims are linked together as a result of two historical processes. These processes determine the two principles upon which state policy and its relationship with Palestinian citizens is based on. One, Israel has emerged as a colonial settler society aiming at displacing the indigenous population and replacing it with Jewish and non-Jewish immigrants. Through this process of colonial settler enterprise, the indigenous population is removed from its land. Two, Israel has been shaped and is still in the process of shaping as a racial society where the state aims to maintain the Jewish ethnic supremacy, this regime promotes the character and content of its ethnic Jewish mission.

The Palestinians in Israel following the Nakbah in 1948

On the eve of the Nakbah in 1948, nearly two million people lived in Palestine. Two-thirds were Palestinian Arabs and one-third Jews. Most Palestinians (about 940,000) and the vast majority of Jews lived in the areas that later became known as the State of Israel. As a result of mass deportations, ethnic cleansing and fights with the invading Jewish forces, about 780,000 (83% of the Palestinian population) fled leaving behind a mere 160,000 Palestinians inside Israel's borders when the battles ended. They comprised 10% of the entire Palestinian population at the time. The subsequent worsening status of the Palestinians was a direct result of the war. The main difference between the Palestinians in Israel and Palestinians elsewhere is the fact that they stayed in their lands and later became Israeli citizens. Yet, this significant fact did not help much as the Israeli government and the various security branches considered them, among other things, an “enemy”. Not only were they regarded as an enemy, but were later considered a security threat and a strategic threat. Israel, in turn, took harsh measures to deter and subdue them, including policies aimed at controlling them.

Yair Boimil recounts that the idea of transfer did not escape the minds of the Zionist leadership as an ideal and practical solution in addressing the Arab minority that remained in the Jewish state. In the late 1960s this option started to lose popularity in light of alternative solutions. Nonetheless, transfer was the dominant solution in the late 1950s. He points out that the Transfer option lost momentum after residents of Kufur Qassem stayed put, despite the massacre of 1956. During this period, Israeli policies toward the Arabs revolved around the following principles: treating the Arabs as a security threat and a fifth pillar, carrying out land confiscations and preventing geographic continuity between Arab population centers, refraining from drafting Arabs into the military, discriminating against them in all aspects of life, amplifying internal tensions on regional and sectarian levels, preventing an Arab leadership from forming and
dismissing the Arabs as a national group while preventing a local Arab economy from forming.32

Three events played a decisive role, both politically and regionally, in the development of the Palestinians in Israel. Furthermore, these events affected them culturally, socially and economically. The first regional event was the war of 1948. It is often referred to by the name “Nakbah” [Catastrophe] in Arab-Palestinian literature, political discourse and historical memory. The second event was the June war of 1967. The Oslo Accord comprises the third event after which the politics and discourse of Palestinians in Israel started to form anew.

The war of 1948 and the Nakbah led to the exodus of the majority of the Palestinian people and to the destruction of their cities and the mutilation of their farms. These actions were carried out in conjunction with the deportation of both political and social leaderships that emerged in earlier decades. Arabs that remained in the State of Israel were primarily rural. The Military Rule that was forced on the Palestinian minority between 1949 and 1966 destroyed all existing social and geographic contiguity. An entire system of laws was created from military orders and various decisions. In that new reality, new leadership was formed, with different characteristics, altogether from the historical leadership of the Palestinian people before 1948.33

Although an indigenous people and a minority in their own homeland—a majority of researchers agree—the political reality that germinated in the aftermath of the Palestinian Nakbah did not permit the Palestinian minority to organize and rebuild itself, politically. The Palestinian minority was a society in ruins; it had little financial and cultural resources and lacked political and social elites.34

The period of the Military Rule between 1949 and 1966 is considered among the most significant periods to affect the political development and political organization of Palestinians in Israel. The military administration put in place an entire system of restrictions and limitations on the freedom of movement for Palestinians in Israel, between population centers and residential areas. In turn, these rules hindered the political work and organization within Palestinian society. The processes of urbanization that started in the 1930s and 1940s were consequently interrupted and terminated. The permit system was subject to security considerations and favoritism to local traditional leaders. The military administration used the heads of clans and traditional leaders as the primary channels to the granting of governmental favors in various fields, including education, work and permits to travel from one place to another. The Military Rule sought to control and to police the Palestinian minority in the new state.35

The Palestinians in Israel represent a marginal group in all political and daily aspects. They are not marginal in Israeli society only. But, that Palestinian minority was the same one that was marginal in Palestinian society in the Galilee and the Triangle before 1948. “Their participation in the Palestinian national movement can be consolidated to one event, their participation in the 1936–1939 rebellion. As a marginal group in the new state, the Palestinians in Israel not only lost their political and cultural elite, but they lost their middle class and the bourgeois. Consequently, the process of “proletarization”, the transformation of a rural farming society to a proletarian one, was the most significant socio-economic transformation to shadow the Palestinian minority during the years of Military Rule. Zureik would later describe it as “deserting agriculture”.36

In the absence of a Palestinian national economy and in the absence of an Arab bourgeois, laborers moved from working the land of Arab villages to the job market in Jewish cities. The isolation experienced by Palestinians in Israel from the outside world, and the
Arab-Palestinian world in particular, lead to a dual marginalization of the Palestinian minority; on the one hand they were marginal in the State of Israel, and on the other hand, they would later become marginal in the Palestinian national movement.37

**Israeli Control System over the Palestinian Minority following the Nakbah**

During the Military Rule period, two similar systems formed in Israel and worked simultaneously; the first was the democratic system among Jews, and a second non-democratic system among Arabs, through the use of the military administration and its various branches. Although the state granted the Arabs some political rights—like the right to vote, after granting them an Israeli citizenship—at the same time it restricted, to the point of choking off, other political rights affirmed by the democratic system and rights of citizens. The most flagrant examples included the denial of the right to freely organize, politically, and the right of movement and assembly. The Military Rule administered a separate judicial system for Arabs. The Arabs, citizens of the State of Israel, came under the jurisdiction of military courts, while Jews came under the jurisdiction of civil courts. The act of separating between the Jews and Arabs in Israel ensured that the Jews in the state had collective and national rights. All the while, Palestinians enjoyed individual rights, albeit not equal.38

The Military Rule worked to establish the state’s control over three aspects considered essential to the success of the Zionist project and the building of the state. These aspects included land appropriation, followed by controlling the Arab workforce that entered the Israeli job market through a system of permits, and finally, preventing the Palestinians in Israel from reaching their compatriots and relatives outside the homeland. Palestinians in Israel were also prohibited from carrying out active and organized political work to change their fate and status.

The military administration and the authorities dominated the political development of Palestinians in Israel. Arabs were isolated from the political, administrative and social structure. This was a process aimed at establishing a more effective political monitoring structure. The Israeli historian, Tom Segev, summed up the political goals of the military administration during its first years as follows:

> The policies of the state sought to divide the Arab residents into sects and regions … Creating municipal authorities in Arab villages, coupled with the competitive environment that existed during elections to the local municipality and deepened the division inside villages. These factors acted in unison to prevent unity among Arab residents.39

Thus, in summary one may say that in respect to the Arab political discourse that formed during the Military Rule period between 1948 and 1966, the said discourse overlooked the reality of defeat to ensure people stayed in their homeland after the war. There was an over-emphasis on civil discourse, focused on achieving the bare minimum of rights and freedoms to provide a semblance of existential security. During the same period, the discourse of nationalism had nearly disappeared. The Military Rule isolated the Palestinians in Israel from their Palestinian, Arab and Islamic surroundings. The crux of their struggle came when they called for the cancellation of the Military Rule without any debate or pre-conditions related to the national issue. In other words, the majority of Arab discourse during those years was civil in nature, detached from political and national discourse that which considers the Palestinians in Israel a part of the Palestinian case and one of its consequences. Even the “Land Movement” that appeared...
in the 1960s emphasized the national Arab affiliation of the Palestinians in Israel and affirmed their position in the Arab national movement and its aspirations.40

**The Impact of the 1967 War**

The war of 1967 represents the second regional event in importance and far reaching consequences in the development of Palestinian society in Israel. The occupation had both direct and indirect effects on the Palestinians in Israel. The war coincided with the abolition of the Military Rule. Contemporary literature at the time focused, primarily, on the effects of the occupation on Palestinian identity in Israel.41 A great portion of this literature asserts that the war contributed to the ingraining of the Palestinian component in the collective identity of Arab society in Israel. The Palestinian component started to compete with the Israeli civilian component in the Arabs’ definition of themselves and their identity. That process is often referred to as “Palestinization”.

Likewise, the occupation affected the patterns and forms of political organization among Palestinians in Israel. In this context, two movements appeared as a consequence of the influence brought on by a meeting of the national secular trend and the Islamic trend in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the secular movement “Abnaa Al-Balad” and the Islamic Movement.

The war of 1967 affected the economic conditions of Palestinian society in Israel. Having been at the bottom of the Israeli economic ladder, the Palestinians in Israel ascended slightly in that ladder. Replacing them at the bottom were the Palestinians from the occupied territories who entered the Israeli job market as cheap labor. The economic improvement experienced by the Palestinians in Israel had extensive social ramifications leading to the emergence of a middle class, an Arab bourgeois and a class of educated Arabs in Israel.42

The war of 1967 influenced the political, economic, and social transformations of Palestinians in Israel. That led to an increase in national awareness among Palestinians in Israel and the establishment of national institutions. The early 1970s comprise the first seed for the emergence of an educated segment and the widening of the middle class which lead to the establishment of institutions with either a national or a regional brand to organize Palestinian society in Israel. These institutions included the National Committee for the Heads of local Arab Municipalities in 1972 and the Regional Alliance for Arab University Students in 1974, the Regional Alliance for Arab High School Students in 1975, in addition to the Committee for Defense of Arab Lands in 1975. These institutions were a formidable foundation in reorganizing and rebuilding the Palestinian society in Israel.43

The enduring process carried out by the Palestinians in Israel to collectively organize came in the aftermath of the 1967 war and the occupation that followed. Sami Mar’i reasons, that the renewed synergy with the Palestinian people created the conditions for an overwhelming politicization of the masses in Palestinian society in Israel. Mar’i explains that, “The Palestinian Arabs did not succeed in merely maintaining their identity while in Israel, but actively worked to infuse Palestinian identity into every spoken and written word, into poems and novels and during the practical exercise of their social and political struggle. It was a process akin to opening the flood gates of Palestinian political awareness and refining it so as to meet the challenges of every stage in the development process of the Palestinian case”.44

The war of 1967 and the increased contact between Palestinian compatriots from both sides of the Green Line (also known as the 1949 Armistice Line) contributed to a feeling
of a shared destiny and the feeling that Arab Palestinians in Israel are an inseparable part of the Palestinian case. Testament to that was the increased cooperation of Palestinians in Israel with the Palestinian movement in paramilitary resistance operations. For example, from the end of the war until July 1970, Israeli courts tried 120 Palestinian citizens of Israel on security charges and arrested another 27 under administrative detention. According to other statistical data, through October 1968, 48 Arabs were arrested for having participated in operations against Israeli security targets, a year later the number increased to 115 Arab arrestees. Furthermore, between 1967 and 1973, 320 Arabs were arrested and tried for participating in resistance operations. A growing class of educated people emerged in the aftermath of the war mainly due to an emphasis on high school preparatory courses for Arab university students in the early 1970s.

The process of political and regional Arab institution building, in addition to an ingrained sense of national identity toward the late 1960s and early 1970s, culminated in the events of Land Day on 30 March 1976. For the first time, Palestinians [in Israel] behaved as an organized and a cohesive national group. The events of Land Day were the crest of a long struggle by social and popular movements, particularly intensifying in the last nine months prior to 29 February 1976. That was the day when Israeli authorities confiscated close to 21,000 Dunams (about 5,200 acres) from the lands of several Arab villages in the central Galilee, including Arrabeh, Sakhnen, Deir-Hannah and Arab Al-Sawa’ed to name a few in order to appropriate them for Jewish settlement building and expansion as part of the Judaization of the Galilee plan.

The political and literary transformations that appeared in the aftermath of the war of 1967 indicate a fundamental change in the relationship between two aspects in the political discourse of the Palestinians in Israel—the civil and the national. The Palestinians adopted collective positions to solve the Palestinian case in line with the solution proposed by the mainstream within the Palestinian national movement. Since the 1970s—and as a result of the domination of civil and political discourse of the position of the Palestinians in Israel and the dynamics of the discussion on equality and Arab-Jewish partnership—a collective political position formed leading toward manifesting civil equality, as well as, solving the national issue and tying the two together. The Palestinians in Israel thought that solving the problem of the occupation in the West Bank and Gaza would improve their civil status, where their civil status is dependent on the national issue seeing as they are an inseparable part of the Palestinian people. This dependence of the political position on the civil status resulted in enhancing the Israeli component in awareness and behavior only to influence political thinking and practice. Consequently, they were able to settle once and for all the question of Israeli citizenship. This meant that the political discourse among Palestinians in Israel linked between the civil aspect and the national aspect for the first time since 1967. The status of the first one became dependent on a solution to the second. This is evident from deciding the issue of citizenship in the Arab political discourse. From another perspective it ensures that the components of this citizenship are not solely depended on the struggle of the Palestinians in Israel, but instead on solving the Palestinian case, as well.

Palestinians in Israel “after Oslo”: Challenging the “Jewish state”

The signing of the Oslo Accord in September 1993 between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the State of Israel and the mutual recognition that followed constitute the third regional event in significance in its influence on the Palestinians in Israel. First is on the level of relationship with the state. Second is on the level of political
discourse, and finally, on the level of political work. The timing of the signing of the Oslo Accord coincided with major global transformations that affected the Palestinian society in Israel, chief among them are globalization and international economic and political transformations, the experience of Palestinians in Israel in the post Oslo period will be analyzed below.

The focus of analysis in the following part will be concerning the political development among the Palestinians in Israel during the last two decades. These developments are unique due to several reasons, most importantly: the first Palestinian Intifada (Resistance) of 1987 and the declaration of a Palestinian state in 1988, in addition to the changes undergone by the Palestinian national movement in its discourse and its operation. This period was characterized by numerous events and developments with effects on the evolution of Palestinians. These developments were merely the beginning of dramatic changes that took place in regard to the Palestinian case. The nineties brought on a new set of changes, from the collapse of the Soviet Union (The Eastern Bloc), the signing of the Oslo accord between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization in 1993, to the accelerated pace of globalization and openness brought on by communications and mass media, the Aqsa Intifada of 2000—commonly referred to as the second Intifada—and finally the Israeli wars on Lebanon in July 2006 and Gaza in December 2008. All these events left their own unique footprint on the Palestinian minority in Israel.

During this period the Palestinians in Israel went from searching for solutions to their status—within the existing Israeli framework—to searching for solutions outside the boundaries of their Israeli citizenship. The first phase lasted from the mid-eighties until the mid-nineties. While it was an extension of a previous phase that started after the end of military rule and Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, it was characterized by a process of democratization and liberalization on the Israeli national level, but more so, on the Palestinians in Israel.

During this phase and until the mid-nineties there was a growing sense of urgency among Palestinians in Israel to obtain Israeli citizenship. Consequently, it became essential for that minority to immerse itself in the state and join the Jewish majority under the same roof. This was evident through various occurrences, some of which, for example, included the declaration of Equality Day in June 1987, participating in demonstrations against the suppression of resistance during the first Intifada and monetarily supporting the Palestinians under occupation as a result of their new-found powers as Israeli citizens. They further supported the political process and accepted the position held by the “Blocking Coalition”.

In the phase that followed—after Oslo—and despite full recognition of Israel’s right to exist, it became clear that the notion of full citizenship and full assimilation within Israel coupled with the hope of establishing a nation of citizens were misplaced. Israel’s government and people did not approve of such an idea. Later developments and events included a large increase in ethnic discrimination and hostilities toward Palestinians in Israel. There was an increase in the number of official policies to further isolate and confine the Palestinians. On the political level, the Israeli government implemented discriminatory tactics which resulted in alienation and land confiscation, particularly in the Naqab area (the south). The proverbial crowning blow to these events came in the form of carnage in October 2000 when Palestinians, citizens of Israel, were shot and killed while demonstrating against the government’s discriminatory policies.

This led the Palestinians in Israel to a new phase, a new approach, to the Israeli framework and the possibility of realizing their prospects as a group and as individuals
through the Israeli citizenship they were given. It was followed by an overhaul and a reassessment of the methods of dissent this minority used through the late nineties. These challenges came with the realization that the Oslo Accord era had ended and that solutions based on international resolutions—in respect to the Palestinian case—were fruitless.

From within this circumstance, an Islamic stream appeared calling for the establishment of a “separate society”. Similarly, the idea of boycotting the Israeli national elections to the Knesset gained traction among the vast majority of the Palestinians in Israel. It was adopted by various political and nationalist powers. There was also a search for solutions outside the parliamentary struggle and new schools of thought emerged in an attempt to move from the ignition stage to the launching stage, a move from the theoretical stage to the practical stage. This lead to an embrace of the concept of a shared homeland, albeit one that is not established on the basis of a Jewish state, while simultaneously exploring the impact of the Nakbah on the Palestinian condition in Israel as an integral part of the Palestinian case. These theoretical debates could also be extended to discuss the struggle faced by many indigenous groups and their resistance to invading colonial powers.

Similarly, one of the characteristics of the last two decades in regard to the experience of the Palestinians in Israel is the debate, which at times bordered on fighting, between the minority and the majority concerning the significance of governance in Israel. This has been the leading topic on the political agenda of both sides, especially among the Jewish side as a response to political and philosophical transformations in the equation of struggle between the minority and the majority. Said majority, has attempted to claim that Israel can be defined as a “Democratic Jewish” state without undermining its democracy.

In contrast, Palestinians in Israel considered this a contradiction in both structure and substance between the state’s Jewish character and democratic character. This, in turn, transformed Israel into a non-democratic system. Consequently, in the last two decades, the majority of Palestinian political and scholarly efforts have been dedicated to exposing the dichotomy between the Jewish character of the state and the democratic notion. This became the rallying call among the Palestinian minority in Israel, to the extent that the head of the General Security Service (Shabak), Yuval Diskin, considered this demand a strategic danger to the state. He announced that the Shabak will sabotage every endeavor seeking to change the state’s Jewish character, however democratic such an endeavor may be.

Thus, this current allegation that the democratic nature permits the “enemies from within” to take advantage of the state by using said democracy against the state’s Jewishness. Therefore, they claim, there is an eternal need to shrink the democratic sphere and expand the state’s Jewish character, along with attaching certain preconditions to citizenship.

So rabid was the radicalization of the Israeli society that Israeli researches started to treat Palestinians in Israel with enmity and intimidation. Dan Shiftan had suggested to break away from dealing with the issue surrounding the Palestinians in Israel as part of the “search for solutions” process and focusing on “monitoring and containment” of the Palestinian minority. A specialist in the extremist right and in violence, Shiftan’s viewpoint is that the Arab “problem” must not be solved, but should be managed throughout demographic, legal and municipal policies. Raphael Israeli, however, genuinely considers the Arabs a strategic threat to the Jewish state. Similarly, Amon Sofer, treats Arab society as a population threat and a ticking demographic bomb. The state’s
Jewishness has been ensured through a combination of exacting academic statutory, legal and political initiatives.56

Recent State of Affairs

One can point to the most significant transformations among the two sides, State and Jews on one side and the Palestinian minority on the other side, during the last decade as characterized by the following:

From the Viewpoint of the “Jewish State”

1. From Assimilation without Equality to Segregation without Autonomy: the majority and the state have previously adopted the assimilation narrative as part of an attempt to absorb the Palestinians in Israel, yet that narrative does not include collective equality for Palestinians in Israel. Instead, it affords them diminished individual equality. The majority still refuses to recognize the Arab minority as a national minority and prefers to deal with it as fragmented sects. The lack of recognition of the collective national rights of the Palestinians in Israel materializes in the majority’s new discourse that calls for separation, but without giving the Arab community any rights as a collective. Some examples of such rights include the power to establish cultural self rule or non-geographic, institutional self-rule.57 The state wishes to maintain its Jewish identity and character through segregation, an act accomplished through statutory, political and municipal means. Walls have been built in some Arab neighborhoods in the [integrated] coastal cities like Al-Lydd and Al-Ramla separating the Jewish neighborhoods from the Arab neighborhoods, caging them inside their own neighborhoods.

2. The Immersion of Politics of Ethnic Superiority, Rather than Politics of Equal Citizenship: globalization did not affect the veneration of politics of citizenship in Israel. In fact, it presented the Israeli case as a model to a condition in which globalization affirmed the state’s identity and character. Throughout the last two decades, Israel has intensified its ethnic politics in favor of politics of citizenship. Surely, Israel defines itself as a democratic Jewish state, yet the Jewish sphere has encroached on the democratic sphere. In many instances the former nullifies any politics of citizenship in dealing with the Palestinian minority in Israel. The most notable example of the ethnic politics is the latest statutory process that enhanced the Jewishness of the state, particularly that which depends on the renewal of the law of citizenship.

3. From Individual Rights to Collective Duties: rights, in the Jewish state, are not derived from the discourse of citizenship, but from membership in the hegemonic (Jewish) group. These rights are not derived through service in the public sphere as defined by the state, either. Despite the dissociation between rights and duties in a democratic system, the Jewish state attempts to tie individual rights with certain duties. In this framework the civil service project was proposed as a link between rights and duties. Furthermore, this proposition attempts to impress upon the members of the Arab minority the relationship between identity and needs in daily affairs. Hence, the requirement for obtaining the rights needed for normal functioning in daily life can only be satisfied by abdicating national identity and dignity and by means of perverting the culture. Civil service is a contradictory act to the long struggle undergone by the Palestinian minority and its cultural and political elite toward reaching a delicate balance between a collective identity and civic affairs, wherein the demand for civil rights becomes part of the glorification of national identity.58
From the Perspective of the Palestinians in Israel

1. From the Politics of Coexistence to the Politics of Rights: the Palestinian political discourse in Israel has moved from the politics of coexistence to the politics of rights, throughout the last two decades. The discourse of coexistence arises from the tools of dialog between the two sides. Yet, the discourse of rights emerges from the demand of the “Other” for group-specific rights by utilizing the tools of the politics of rights, including litigation and political dissent.

In the politics of coexistence, the two sides meet face to face, exposed to the entire social collective of each side, respectively. Whereas, in the politics of rights, each side sees the other through a prism of gains, without the need to be exposed to each side’s social group. Here, neither side sees directly the face of the other, but through the prism of one’s own side’s interests. The relationships that direct the politics of coexistence stand in opposition to each other. But, the relationships in the politics of rights are usually horizontal or stratified where there are those who demand rights and those who demand progress that which will advance rights. The relationships in the politics of coexistence are personal ones; they are attained through direct overtures toward the individual or group. Relationships in the politics of rights are formal as they are conducted by legal means. Sagi stresses that the politics of coexistence and dialog are opposites to the politics of rights; in the discourse of rights each side hunkers down in its position, and behind its own borders attempts to maintain its world and identity from encroachments by the other side. Thus, interaction between the two sides is carried out indirectly, normally through litigation or protest. In the politics of coexistence and dialog, fences come down, but identity is threatened. It is for that reason that the discourse of rights came to protect identity, and not accidentally, there was a shift in the Palestinian narrative in Israel, a shift to the politics of rights, at a time when the issue of identity became a deciding factor in the politics of the Palestinian minority.59

2. From Identity to the Politics of Identity: the politics of identity are considered one of the prevalent politics in the politics of marginalized groups.60 Similarly, they represent a change in the evolution of the political discourse of Palestinians in Israel throughout the last two decades. This is accomplished by utilizing the politics of identity, intentionally or unintentionally, in order to ensure the collective self and reinforce the “I” against the “Other”. Identity is in turn defined by “Otherness”, not merely by itself alone. Thus, identity is not fixed or complete; were it so, it would wither. Writing on identity is political and ideological in nature, where the writing affects the author’s identity as well. The formation of identity is a political and an ideological process, carried out by the political and cultural electorate among the ranks of a group, as part of standing up to the “Other” and gaining rights from him. Identity is also part of the human body of work, for there would be no identity without work and no work can be accomplished without identity. Identity represents the self, while the politics of identity represents the work. The politics of identity works towards improving the status of the marginalized group through its formation as a group against another hegemonic group. The Palestinian psychologist, Ramzi Suliman, asserts that the politics of identity occurs “when we speak about the political-social dimension of the collective identity. Hence, this discourse comes down to a debate over the reciprocal relationship between identity and political action for the individual that carries the collective identity, or to a group of people who share a single collective identity. Simply put, when we speak of collective identity manifestations in political action we are speaking of the politics of identity”.61 The entirety of Palestinian political movements in Israel practices the politics of identity; the Islamic movement
practices the politics of identity that stem from Islamic identity; the national movement practices the politics of identity stemming from the Arab-Palestinian identity.

Even the Communist movement (the Front, as well) practices the politics of identity despite the social class division that characterizes its political agenda. The politics of identity that distinguish the political Palestinian discourse in Israel during this period is part of the struggle with the hegemonic majority to achieve collective and political rights.

3. From the Politics of Representation to Political Representation: within the framework of the refusal of the state to recognize the Arabs as a national group with collective rights, the politics of representation are considered one of the methods used to control weak ethnic groups and contain them. The politics of representation seek to work on appointing representatives from within a minority to official positions, or as token gestures, to serve as an indicator that the minority, or the marginalized group, is represented in state institutions. That individual representative does not necessarily—or perhaps quite often—represent the political trends among the minority, but represents instead, those of the majority and the state. Such an individual is usually used as a symbol for the minority group’s equality in government institutions. The politics of representation can vary, for example, from the appointment of Arab ministers in Israeli government (two have been appointed thus far), the appointment of Arab deputy ministers or to the appointment of Arabs in official positions in the Israeli bureaucratic system—in the field of education, for example. The politics of representation are used as part of the state’s public relations effort to improve the status of the minority and assimilate it into the state.

The politics of representation are considered part of the “primary” discourse of equality among the ranks of Arabs, as well. This discourse, however, has started to retreat in face of new discourse on political representation, instead of the politics of representation. The basis for political representation rests on the premise that Arab representatives must express the positions and opinions of the marginalized group, not the positions of the hegemonic majority. Otherwise, there is no purpose in assimilating Arabs into representational or political institutions in the state. To that end, it is no coincidence that Arab deputies and Arab ministers in the Israeli Knesset have all been deputies to Zionist parties and as a result were not represented in the High Follow-up Committee for Arabs in Israel. Such is the case because they do not represent the national and civil foundations as the Arab minority sees them. The discourse of political representation is part of the collective demands calling for a change in the nature of the Jewish state and establishing, in its place, a bi-national state, or a state for all its citizens. The demands are based on the idea that political representation loses its good standing in state institutions when the ethnic character of the state remains strongly present.

4. Between the Politics of Difference and the Politics of Recognition: two competing political discourses have been growing in parallel among the Palestinians in Israel, the first is the discourse of difference, and the second is the discourse of recognition. The politics of recognition call upon the majority to respect the minority and its particularity. Furthermore, the politics of recognition are a new trend characteristic to the political Arab discourse in the last two decades. It calls for the recognition of Arabs in Israel as a national minority including their accompanying rights. Integral to this discourse are demands for recognition of the historical narrative of the Palestinian minority through school textbooks. At the very least, said discourse calls on the majority to carry out projects affirming the minority’s historical narrative.

Alongside the politics of recognition—politics which stem from collective rights—are the politics of difference. These are initiatives demanding recognition from the state or the majority. Within this framework, a collective of political, cultural, social and insti-
tutional actions appear. Such actions attempt to exercise said collective rights absent the need for the state or the majority to recognize them; similar to the fashion in which a group of Arab academics and professionals embarked on writing two projects on historical terminology for Arab students as part of the historical narrative—in the same custom a hegemonic Zionist narrative has been written. It is pertinent to point out that the collective political work of the Islamic Movement (in particular, the extra-parliamentary branch) is classified as being part of the politics of difference and not part of the politics of recognition. Of course, there exists a convergence in many instances between these two approaches. Thus, one cannot discuss the case of the Palestinian minority in Israel as if the two approaches were mutually exclusive. Alongside these changes and the relationship with the state and the Jewish majority, the last two decades have been marked by an alarming decline in the internal political culture within Palestinian society. This decline was most noticeable after the Al-aqsa Intifada.

Political culture may refer to the lack of collective political action. It is marked by the dominance of precarious personal and partisan interests to the point of corruption in Palestinian political work. There is a notable focus on individual work rather than collective work. In turn, collective work is sabotaged if it is not in line with certain partisan positions. This disintegration reached the point where movements and parties were undermining each other’s legitimacy. One would have expected the Aqsa Intifada and the common political and non-political threats facing the Palestinians to galvanize society in working together and showing reciprocal solidarity, but the opposite was true. That, in turn, served to dissuade the public from participating in national and political activities and brought on the return of Zionist parties to the Arab street in Israel. As a result, we saw a decline in the last two decades and a defragmentation of the collective identity leading to sectarian conflicts in Nazareth, Tur’an, Al-Mghar, Shfa’amro, Ebilin and others. Conflicts among various clans turned violent and claimed many a young man as victims.

At a time when the minority needed to unite and sustain itself against challenges from the Jewish institution, crimes of tradition and organized crime became widespread to the extent killing was a normal weekly occurrence in Arab society.

Conclusion

The last two decades have witnessed political plans preceded by intensive political declarations surrounding the idea of population exchange or the merging of Palestinian areas in Israel and settlement blocks in the West Bank as part of a final solution for the Palestinian and Israeli problem. Often, the debate revolves around the inclusion of areas from the Triangle region to the future Palestinian state. This, in turn, would rid Israel of a large number of Palestinians within the framework of the “demographic threat” which became a political neurosis in Israel. These declarations then transformed and found their way to political party platforms, such as the “Yisrael Beiteinu” party, which is a prominent factor in the Israeli current government.

In essence, these discussions over the “demographic threat” are not new. It was considered a security issue in past decades. In the seventies, for example, the “Demography Committee” held a meeting in January 1976 to study the subject of family planning among the Palestinians in Israel community. Present at the meeting were the Committee chairwoman, Zeena Herman. Among the participants was the Prime Minister’s Arab Affairs Adviser, Shmuel Toledano. The participants agreed that the meetings should remain secret, away from the watchful eyes of the press. Toledano considered the
“Demographic problem is the main problem these days”. What is new in the recent debate on demography is its ferocity and saliency, coupled with the attempts to revoke the political legitimacy of an entire Palestinian population in Israel as a group.

Arnon Sofer is considered among the most vocal on the demographic threat. In March 2002, he presented a paper to the former Prime Minister, Sharon, concerning his opinion on solving the demographic blight. Sofer’s paper was later discussed at the Committee of Foreign Affairs and Security and throughout the Herzliya Conference for Security and Civil Defense. In his paper, Sofer recommended handing over the Triangle region and East Jerusalem to the Palestinian Authority, hence, significantly reducing the number of Muslim Palestinians in Israel. This would rid Israel of 400,000 people (210,100 in East Jerusalem and 190,000 in the Triangle). The Muslim Arab population is expected to reach 800,000 by the year 2020. In contrast, Sofer’s recommendation would result in a mere 200,000 Christian Arabs and 150,000 Druze and a Million Muslims living in Israel in 2020. Conversely, the Jewish population will have reached six million.

In Sofer’s above-mentioned paper he stated: “All Israel’s residents have come to understand that there is only one solution for stopping our crazy suicidal neighbor and that is, disengagement.” But, Sofer did not rationalize his disengagement idea—including East Jerusalem—as security related. Instead, he explained it as demographics related. His letter read: “You must have known for months of the gloomy demographic statistics. In the absence of separation there will be a Palestinian majority. That will signal the end of the Jewish State of Israel. It is important that you keep in mind that on the same day the Israeli Defense Force makes the efforts and succeeds in assassinating a terrorist here and there, in the western land of Israel 400 babies will be born and some of them will later become the new terrorists. Four-hundred newborns everyday! Do you understand that?”

“Demographics” topped the list of priorities in regard to the separation in Arnon Sofer’s project to the extent that Richard Harris, the head of the Planning Division at the US State Department asked Sofer what percentage of his project focuses on security and what percentage focuses on demographics. Sofer replied, “100% demographics.” Sofer’s statements are a representative sample of the many declarations surrounding the transfer and the merging of populated Palestinian areas in Israel to the Palestinian state within the framework of solving the demographic problem to maintain a Jewish majority. One of the leading personalities to favor this idea was the former Prime Minister, Ehud Barak. He put forth his vision in an interview conducted by the historian, Benny Morris, for the New York Review of Books magazine (June 2002). During the interview, Barak stated that he was prepared to join areas in the Triangle to a Palestinian state and in return conjoin a settlement block with Israel.

The latest statement to come from a prominent personality in Israel was the statement given by the former Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, Tzipi Livne. She said, “The founding of a Palestinian state is an existential solution to the citizens of Israel, the Arabs included”. Livne’s comment came after the decision of The High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens in Israel in which it called on the Palestinian leadership to refrain from recognizing Israel as a Jewish state. Here, the ethnic character of the Jewish state manifests itself not only by virtue of being partial to the Transfer debate, but more so by taking an active part due to its attribute of being a Jewish state. Thus, the revival of the “Demographics Council” is accomplished, for it is meant to treat population growth in Palestinian society.

The last decade stands out in the experience of the Palestinians in Israel as a result of distinct transformations in political discourse. On the issue of the status of the Palestinian
minority there has been disunity to a breaking point between this aspect and the resolution of the Palestinian case. The Palestinians in Israel have realized that solving the Palestinian case through the establishment of a Palestinian state besides Israel will not necessarily improve their local and political status in the Jewish state. Nay, that status depends primarily on changing the ethnic character of the state and establishing a new political system in Israel.

NOTES


5. Usually the literature refer to them in different terms: “Palestinians in Israel”, “Arabs in Israel”, “Arab citizens in Israel”, “the Palestinian minority” and “Palestinians inside 1948”.

6. These data are more reliable as they do not include the Palestinians in East Jerusalem nor do they include the residents of the Golan Heights. See Raseem Khamaysi, The Arab Society in Israel Yearbook, Jerusalem: Van Leer Institution, 2010 (in Hebrew).


8. Ibid., p. 29.


11. Ibid.


18. Ibid.

19. The Human Rights Library website at the University of Minnesota: <http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/>


22. About this debate see Asad Ghanem and Mohanad Mustafa, “The Palestinians in Israel”, op. cit.


25. Ibid.


30. As’ad Ghanem and Mohanad Mustafa, The Palestinians in Israel, op. cit., p. 25.
32. Ibid.
35. Yair Boimil, A Blue and White Shadow, op. cit.
38. Yair Boimil, A Blue and White Shadow, op. cit.
40. Ibid.
42. Aziz Haidar, The Arab population in Israeli Economy, Tel-Aviv: International Center for Peace in the Middle East, 1990.
43. Elie Rekhess, The Arab Minority in Israel, Tel Aviv: Amm Ovid, 1993 (in Hebrew).
47. The Blocking Coalition (Block) refers to the Arab political parties in the Knesset during the years 1992–1995. At a time when Rabin’s coalition government did not have the necessary votes to approve agreements, the Block provided support from outside the coalition by voting in favor of Rabin’s political agreements with the Palestinian Authority. For details, see, As’ad Ghanem. “The Limited Efficiency in Parliamentary Politics of the Arab Minority in Israel: The Elections for the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Knessets”, Israeli Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1998, pp. 72–93.
52. Alexander Yakobson and Amnon Rubenstein, Israel and The Other Nations, op. cit.
57. Sammy Smooha, Autonomy for the Arabs in Israel, Jerusalem: Center for Arab Society Studies, 1999 (in Hebrew).
58. As’ad Ghanem and Mohanad Mustafa, The Palestinians in Israel, op. cit.

64. Asad Ghanem and Mohanad Mustafa, *The Palestinians in Israel*, op. cit.


71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.


